China's maritime supremacy strategy is a comprehensive national strategy that prioritises national security and sets three goals: first, to achieve sustainable economic development by maintaining internal stability and order; second, to effectively deal with external security threats; and third, to maintain influence in neighbouring countries. The first is to achieve sustainable economic development by maintaining domestic stability and order; the second is to safeguard territorial integrity and sovereignty by effectively dealing with external security threats; and the third is to secure and maintain influence in neighbouring countries. To achieve these goals, China has adopted a two-pronged strategy: the traditional political and military methods of a great power and the diplomatic and strategic methods of a minor power to protect its interests through territorial integrity. The ultimate goal of China's national strategy is to secure a strong political and military position and economic prosperity. While the likelihood of large-scale conflicts involving China, particularly in Northeast Asia, has diminished, the likelihood of various forms of regional conflict that were previously latent in the East-West confrontation has increased. Examples include the dispute between Japan and Russia over the four Northern Islands and the dispute between Japan and China over the Diaoyu Islands.

China's naval strategy focuses on maritime deterrence and territorial integrity, defending the sovereignty of its islands, and securing maritime rights and interests for economic development. Naval power is a key component in fulfilling these missions. China's maritime strategy, the Active Nearshore Defense Strategy, has expanded its mission to focus on modernising the navy and enhancing naval power projection capabilities. This is being achieved through the acquisition of large destroyers and submarines. Since 1985 and until recently, China's naval construction programme has focused on building large surface ships equipped with guided missiles and sophisticated electronics, developing new ground-based medium-range bombers, and improving submarine capabilities. Since the conversion of the Varyag aircraft carrier, purchased from Ukraine in 1998, and its commissioning as the Liaoning in September 2012, the country has accelerated the construction of warships. It is expected to build four to six aircraft carriers over the next 20 to 30 years. This increase in power will enable the PLA Navy to conduct sea denial operations 400 nautical miles from its coast in a short period of time. China's naval modernisation is primarily aimed at becoming a maritime superpower in East Asia.


Organsky hypothesises how a hegemonic power can prevent a challenger from escalating, arguing that if a hegemonic power wants to prevent a challenger from escalating, it must impose various controls on the challenger to keep it in check. In addition, the hegemon, in consultation with its allies, uses the method of retarding industrialisation by blocking resources or trade that are essential for the development of the challenging country. These challenges and counter-challenges are also at the heart of the US-China bilateral relationship.


Another part of the US strategy to contain China is the Taiwan issue. Taiwan is the most sensitive issue in US-China relations. China wants to reunify the two sides under the principle of "one country, two systems", but the United States does not want to reunify the two sides for its own economic and strategic interests. In other words, the United States reaps huge economic benefits from selling arms to Taiwan and uses Taiwan as an important base in its strategy to contain China. Taiwan is an important point connecting the lines of defence between the Korean peninsula, Japan and countries in Southeast Asia. China strongly opposes US arms sales to Taiwan, but US arms sales to Taiwan continue.

China views naval power as an important military force and is committed to developing its naval capabilities as it seeks to modernise its armed forces to proactively prevent conflicts involving its territory. China's maritime strategy has evolved from a coastal defence strategy to a near-shore defence strategy, focusing on waters far from the coast. It has evolved into an active offshore defence strategy proposed by Navy Commander Liu Huaqing in the 1980s. The offshore includes the continental shelf, the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, the South China Sea archipelago, and Guam and the Mariana Islands. The concept of active defence also refers to an offensive defence strategy that is not merely defensive in nature, but focuses on maritime interdiction and control against localised coastal and maritime attacks.

Therefore, by 2000, the PLA should have an active defence capability in the waters within the first island chain based on its near-shore fleet capability; by 2020, it should have an offshore fleet capability to provide medium-range forward defence in the waters within the second island chain from 200 nautical miles to 600 nautical miles; and by 2050, it should have a long-range forward defence capability in the waters outside the second island chain beyond 600 nautical miles. While the Chinese government emphasises that these policies and strategies are designed to defend itself, they are also designed to strategically dominate the East Asian region.

China sees regional hegemony in East Asia as an essential strategy to counter the US-led global strategy. It therefore actively participates in the APT, the EAS and the ASEAN-led ASEAN Regional Form (ARF), as well as leading multilateral security consultations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organ isation (SCO) and the Six-Party Talks. It also actively partic ipates in the Shangri-La Dialogue at the non-governmental level. On the basis of peaceful development and a harmonious world, China emphasises the common interests and ideals of peace, harmony and prosperity in East Asia in order to cooperate with East Asian countries and address the concerns of countries in the region. At the same time, it has implemented a multi-dimensional soft power strategy in East Asia, including economic, diplomatic and cultural.

China has accepted the US-led world system and become an important member of it, but is dissatisfied with its continuation. As a result, it is trying to change certain aspects of the US-led world order through diplomacy. In other words, instead of military conquest, China believes that its economic development and expansion of international influence through trade and investment is the way forward. In response, the United States seeks to secure its regional dominance by strengthening bilateral security alliances in East Asia. China is dissatisfied with the US regional alliance system in East Asia, which it sees as a check and balance against its own interests. In response, China seeks to break free from US-led containment through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. While the existing US hegemony in the region has played an important role in maintaining regional stability and international order in East Asia, China is actively engaged in the region's affairs to ensure its own continued hegemony and to prevent the emergence of a virtual new superpower.

According to A.F.K. Organski's theory of power transitions, there are two groups of states in a hierarchical system: the satisfied and the dissatisfied. A few powerful and weak states that are allied with the dominant state and have friendly relations with the dominant state without complaining about the order led by the dominant state (hegemon) are the dominant state satisfiers. The remaining states are dissatisfied and disobedient to the dominant order and system. Dissatisfied states have a strong rejection of the hegemonic international order, the status quo and the order of things. Oganski's international system of states is a pyramid structure with the dominant state (hegemonic state) at the top of the pyramid. The hegemonic state determines the system according to its own national interests and seeks to maintain stability. Dissatisfied and disobedient to this international system, dissatisfied states have a strong rejection of the international order and system led by the hegemonic state. Dissatisfied states ostensibly accept the current hegemonic international order and system, but as their national power increases, they seek to change it.

China belongs to this group of disaffected states. Dissatisfied with the existing interna tional system, China is a challenger within the system and is engaged in a power struggle with the United States in the military, security, economic and political spheres. The US-China dual strategy of cooperation and competition, containment and intervention, is the embodiment of this struggle. For example, on the North Korean nuclear issue, the United States and China are strategically cooperating in their common interests. Therefore, China has actively promoted the six-party talks as a multilateral approach to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. China's basic position is to denuclearise the Korean Peninsula, achieve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation. China opposes North Korea's nuclear development and possession, especially after Pyongyang's third nuclear test, and points out its irresponsible behaviour. There is also a growing consensus in China that North Korea should respect China's national interests and resume normal state-to-state relations with China. In the United States, the Obama administration prepared a more relaxed strategy than the Bush administra tion, but the Trump administration has returned to a hard line. At the US-Chi na summit, the US sought to facilitate US-North Korea dialogue through China, but the US has demanded that China play an active role in denouncing North Korea as a nuclear state and denuclearisation as a strategic goal for North Korea. To achieve denuclearisation, all sanctions against North Korea, including the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, must be implemented in close cooperation between the United States and China. Therefore, China will strive to avoid conflicting paths and build a new model of cooperation and competition based on the common interests of the United States and China. The North Korean nuclear issue is a serious problem affecting regional stability and peace in East Asia. It is an important factor for China's sustainable economic development. It can also have a major impact on the maintenance of the US hegemonic system. At present, the US hegemony maintains regional stability and peace in Northeast Asia, but North Korea is dissatisfied with the current system and order. North Korea's provocations could shock regional stability and peace, disrupt the current system and order, and affect US hegemonic aspirations.

As the Asia-Pacific economy became more important to the United States politically and economically, it actively pursued membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP was originally a multilateral free trade agreement with little influence, but it began to attract attention in 2011 when the United States became an active participant. At that time, South Korea and Japan, US allies in East Asia, also announced their intention to join the TPP. The main reason for the United States' active push to join the TPP is its concern about the expansion of China's influence in the region. In the case of China, its active participation in the TPP, along with its proposal for regional economic integration, has given it an important position in the region's economy. However, China's role is becoming more important as the United States does not participate in the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and ASEAN+6 (China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India) forums, which are the forums for cooperation in East Asian regional economic integration. As China's influence expanded geographically, the United States began to feel uneasy. In response, the United States actively promoted the TPP and hoped to continue to play a leading role in the region. In other words, the TPP sought to change the power structure within regional cooperation in order to regain its leadership role in the regional economy. China did not participate in the US-led TPP because the TPP had become a US-led strategy to block China. On the other hand, the United States said that the TPP had no strategy to block China and that the door was open for China to join the TPP.

However, China could not help but feel uneasy and concerned about this American strategy. In response to the TPP and the US-led Asian Development Bank (ADB), China led the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), an international financial institution officially launched in October 2014 under China's leadership. In 2015, Western and regional countries expressed their willingness to join, and China sought to secure its own economic development, expand its regional influence and secure diplomatic leadership by establishing economic interests with neighbouring countries. It was an attempt to counter the US-led regional order through economic friendship with neighbouring countries. Rather than directly challenging the US-led internati onal order, China found it more practical to create a system of rational cooperation to expand its influence and contain the United States. China's AIIB strategy is also to weaken US-centric influe nce by establishing a relationship of common interest through cooperation with neighbouring countries.

The United States, as a hegemonic nation, wants to prevent China from shifting its power through various controls, but this is difficult in reality. This is because the United States and China have formed a very deep economic interdependence, and if the United States blocks China's economic development, it could have a significant impact on its own economy. Therefore, the two countries should pursue economic development together through cooperation. In other words, the right perspective is for US-China relations to develop into healthy competition. However, the United States wants to prevent the transfer of power to China in East Asia by working with its allies to contain China. The United States has deployed THAAD in South Korea because of North Korea's nuclear weapons, but on the other hand everyone knows that this is to contain China. China opposes the deployment of THAAD in South Korea because it threatens its national security and regional peace. Above all, China is showing signs of acquiescing to North Korea's polarising statements and nuclear weapons development, which the international community cannot understand. Moreover, its surprisingly quick response to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea without taking clear measures against North Korea is increasing mistrust and doubts about China. This attitude is not the attitude of a great power, and it will be talked about as long as the international community continues to do so, causing the limits of trust in China.

In response to China's growth and response, the United States intends to counter China's rise by returning to East Asia and strengthening relations with regional allies to maintain its influence in East Asia. One of the key elements of the US rebalance strategy is to strengthen bilateral security alliances with its allies. An ally's security focus means ensuring collective military capabilities to deter relevant countries and non-state actors. The ROK-US alliance is also being strengthened within this framew ork. The strengthening of the ROK-US alliance is aimed at deterri ng North Korea's provocations and keeping China and Russia in check, thereby maintaining US-led military leadership in the region.

China sees the ROK-US alliance as a strategy to contain North Korea and contain China. In other words, it sees the US-Japan alliance as a US strategy to encircle China in the Asia-Pacific region. China's response strategy to strengthen the ROK-US alliance is to weaken the alliance with the US by strengthening interdependent economic interests with countries in the region. However, China continues to strengthen its military power. Although neighbouring countries are strengthening their economic ties with China, they are concerned about the threat posed by China's growing military power. For example, China's hardline stance on maritime territorial and territorial waters disputes has raised concerns. Under these circumstances, the United States is also stepping up its return to East Asia and actively intervening in the South China Sea dispute. China, on the other hand, strongly opposes the US stance on the South China Sea dispute. The South China Sea dispute is a situation in which the strategic competition between the United States and China is intensifying. In response to China's increased maritime patrols in the South China Sea, the United States is stepping up its sales of warships to the Philippines and its support for the Philippines' freedom of navigation.

China is strengthening its military power and maritime hegemony based on its rapid economic growth, but the gap with the United States is still large. Therefore, although the Chinese government considers continuous economic development to be of the utmost importance, it will be difficult for China to become a regional hegemonic power centred on Northeast Asia. Since the existing hegemonic power, the United States, has strategic points of convergence and divergence, cooperation and competition, containment and intervention, regional hegemony centred on China is only possible through coexistence with the United States. In response, China is seeking to expand its leadership in the region by weakening the US-centred regional alliance through strengthe ning economic ties. In other words, China is doing its utmost to expand its hegemonic position to protect its sovereignty by prioritising its own interests in maritime hegemony.